Part Four
Before we can present a description and chronology of the recruitment and enlistment drive for the Waffen-SS carried out by the Volksbund in
At its inception the Schutzstaffel was an Order and Fraternity in an almost medieval sense to carry out a specific purpose. When it was first established in 1929 they served as Adolph Hitler’s body guards, “schwarze Leibgarde” which in German is descriptive of the black uniform that they wore. Heinrich Himmler was appointed to be its first Führer in command of the two hundred and fifty handpicked men that were originally part of the SA (Sturmabteilung) (Storm troopers) of Ernst Röhm, the so-called “brown shirts”. The unit was originally intended to protect Hitler as security guards but it was always also to be a political instrument to carry out his personal policies and from the outset was associated with carrying out the racial and resettlement priorities he had in mind. After 1933 it expanded rapidly and developed into a million man army. The spread of the SS all across the country was rapid. In 1930 there were 2,000 members of the SS and by 1931 there were 10,000. This was by intent and the goal of the Nazi leadership.
Himmler established strict demands of recruits more suitable for a monastic order with his demand for chastity (purity), integrity, loyalty to the Führer, unquestioning obedience, honouring his comrades, rigorous with one’s self and others and a model of family life. In short they were to emulate the best of the lifestyle of the fabled Prussian military officer as their personal ideal as the fulfillment of the historical development of the German people and as an example for the entire nation. With the assistance of Heydrich the head of the SD (Security Division) Himmler was able to access power and prestige for the SS. In the intervening years between 1932-1937 in which power struggles and intrigue were the order of the day among the Nazi leadership the SS developed uniformity in purpose no longer hampered by the SD apparatus and restraints and spread all across
With the elimination of Ernst Röhm and his “brown shirts”, Himmler had a free hand to now establish an SS army outside of the jurisdiction of the SD and interference from the Gestapo. In 1936 these troops numbered 210,000 men of whom 90% were assigned for “special duty” and another 10% were in the Totenkopf (Death Heads) units. By the end of the war they number 1,000,000 men of whom 30,000 were in the Death Heads units and the forces now also included foreign nationals from such diverse nations as
German hegemony was established across south-eastern Europe after the fall of
The movement of German troops through Hungary and Romania to support the Italian invasion of Greece in January and February of 1941 and the subsequent German military conquest and territorial dismemberment of Yugoslavia with the help of Hungary in April of 1941, despite the suicide of Teleki in protest over it on April 3, 1941 and Hungary’s joining in the war against the USSR on June 27, 1941 all put the final seal and cemented the alliance between Germany and Hungary. Hitler’s political ideological objectives now became part of his military goals. Like all of the associations of the German minorities in south-eastern Europe, the Volksbund in
The situation was different in the newly acquired territories in
The embassy was following Hitler’s official line not to rock the boat in terms of German and Hungarian relations. The Hungarian General Staff was of the point of view that every member of the German minority had the right to join the German army and fight for the German war objectives according to a note from the ambassador von Jagow to the Reich Foreign Office in Berlin. The Hungarian Foreign Office for their part refused to accept the practical implications and the view of their General Staff and instead asked for the resettlement out of
On November 17, 1941 the German Counsul in
The general policy of collaboration on the part of
On the other hand, Horthy was upset and disturbed by the support the Nazis provided for the Arrow Cross Party and the increased activity of the Volksbund after 1938. As a result he sought to stop and curtail the emigration of military-age Germans to the Reich who were being sent to
“Our eighteen year old sons, Adam Keller and Joseph Jäger and seventy of their comrades from our County of Baranya who are all members of the local Bund were tricked and talked into going to Germany as well as bribed by the Bund to participate in a two to three month sport’s training programme which would produce great results for them. They had secret medical examinations on July 9, 1941 and were taken secretly from the Deutsches Haus in
We are simple German farmers and are asking you for justice. We will not accept this injustice that our minor age sons who were promised a sport’s training programme in order to coax them from their homes have instead been forced into becoming soldiers and sent to the front lines. Our children write us pitiful letters. They want to come home. We and many other parents have made uncountable numbers of visits and made complaints to the Volksbund and the German Counsul about this matter and have our children returned to us, but without any result. We beg you, our great and righteous Führer to hear our plea and send our children back home to us. They were in Lager Kahlberg 12 in Brünn when we last heard from them.”
Their letter was dated October 23, 1941 in Oroszko and signed by Stephen Keller and Anton Jäger.
After arriving in
During the Yugoslavian campaign Wehrmacht and SS officers attempted to recruit Swabians on their way through
In spite of attempts to get the co-operation of the German embassy in
According to what we know of the situation in October 1, 1941 there were around 2,000 young men serving the Waffen-SS from the Batschka; 1,500 in the German Wehrmacht and 2,000 served as sentries and guards at work and labour installations and by the end of 1941 there were twenty youth who had been killed in action.
The Volksbund in Hungary had to operate cautiously in recruiting young men from among the German minority to serve in the Waffen-SS and Wehrmacht until the end of 1941 in order to cover their backsides because they knew that the Hungarian Constitution called for the revoking the citizenship of anyone who joined the army of another state and treated them as a traitor. In spite of warnings from the Hungarian government and military and the arrest of individuals found serving in German units the Hungarians continued to hold back from exercising their full prerogative. Both the Volksbund and the Hungarian government acted cautiously avoiding sharp confrontations. This holding back on the part of the Hungarians was due above all to Nazi Germany. While on
The leading German clergy and government officials of German origin unleashed a hostile attack directed against the Volksbund and their attempts to win the German youth in
The reasons behind the majority support of the German minorities in south-eastern Europe for Hitler’s policy of conquest had its basis in the non-acceptance of the rights of the minorities that had been guaranteed by the Treaty of Trianon and the lack of the implementation of any as well as the treatment of the German minority in various ways by the various national governments from German language schools to economic hindrances and restrictions imposed upon them. In a sense it is no wonder that idealistic youth were prepared to cross the frontier and voluntarily join the Waffen-SS or the Wehrmacht. They became pawns in a world of politics far beyond their understanding and the possible consequences. It was only a matter of time before the Nazis made clear to the Hungarian government that the German minority in
During a visit to
Bárdossy agreed to Ribbentrop’s request in principle because he believed it was a way he could get rid of the activist younger Bund members. Concrete discussions only began after the Nazi government accepted three conditions put forth by the Hungarian government:
1) Only Germans who volunteer will be enlisted into the Waffen-SS
2) parents of all volunteers must approve in writing
3) who enlist must be given German citizenship immediately and consequently surrender their Hungarian citizenship.
The second point would be reworked and parental consent was not required after the age of twenty-four years. Those who were opposed to the recruitment campaign would find the Volksbund a formidable opponent. They would face ridicule and be ostracized from the “brotherhood”. This would prove especially true in northern
Even though the Hungarian Minister of Defence disagreed at first to support the Prime Minister in the matter, in short order he changed his mind and agreed to the German request but recognized that it was a demand.
On January 30, 1942 officials representing Himmler arrived in
With their acceptance of the recruitment of the German minority for the Waffen-SS,
On February 20, 1942 the terms of the agreement between
On April 3, 1942 the first recruitment campaign carried out by the Volksbund reported the following statistics for all regions of
Batschka: 12,868 volunteers registered; 3,452 rejected; 9,416 recruited; 4,173 in the SS; 5,243 in the Wehrmacht.
Mitteberg: 2,312 volunteers registered; 827 rejected; 1,485 recruited; 439 in the SS; 1,046 in the Wehrmacht.
Szatmar: 1,414 volunteers registered; 475 rejected; 939 recruited; 406 in the SS; 533 in the Wehrmacht.
Swabian
Totals: 25,709 volunteers registered; 7,849 rejected; 17,860 recruited; 7,566 in the SS; 10,294 in the Wehrmacht.
On the basis of population density in the various regions of
In a letter from the Ministry of Defence to the German ambassador in Budapest von Jagow was informed that the Volksbund were taking charge of the contingents of young Swabians being called up to serve in the Hungarian military. The Minister of Defence indicated he could not let this happen. In March of 1942 Basch was supposed to have ordered that all of the wounded, whether serving in the Waffen-SS or the Hungarian Army would be taken over by the Volksbund following their convalescence. This was also to include those who had served bravely in battle. These actions once again greatly provoked the Hungarian government and led to a court case held on June 27th in which Basch and his deputy Goldschmidt were charged with espionage by the Minister of the Interior. The same charges were also levelled at Dr. Stephen Weber the Führer of the
In Szatmar and Western Hungary as well as other regions of the land there was a noticeable decline in the number of volunteers and a refusal to participate in the campaign for recruitment into the Waffen-SS along with a growing opposition as a result of counter propaganda efforts. In the Batschka, Adam Berenz boasted of the Waffen-SS recruitment campaign openly but there had been few results. This slow down of recruitment allowed the Hungarian police to get in on the act, and they used the slightest provocation to abuse the volunteers even though they were supposed to provide support in the recruitment drive. All of this led to escalation of fear and a quick dispatching of recruits at a time when rail transport was at a premium.
In Bistritz in northern Transylvania for example, the so-called SS volunteers, were assembled on the athletic field behind the German junior college on April 17, 1942 in a roped off area and then marched to the train station not allowing them to make contact with any of their family members nor were they allowed to see them leave. They boarded cattle cars 2 kilometres outside of town. After the cars were loaded the regional Führer and his cohorts appeared. The Nazi officials called the family members to speak to them and explained that it did not sit well with the Hungarian officials that the recruits were being taken into the German military but they had been forced to act in this way. The train left with its cargo of SS recruits for Klausenberg,
The departure of the volunteer SS recruits from
The Hungarian government’s reluctance and hostility with regard to the carrying out of the recruitment drive for SS volunteers was now focussed on the families of the recruits who on the basis of Hungarian law had also lost their citizenship and were now going to experience the result of that. The chicanery and machinations of the Hungarian police were set into motion right after the departure of the recruits and now directed against their family members. The wives of SS volunteers experienced great difficulties in particular. Their husbands who were now citizens of the Reich were no longer owners of Hungarian property according to the law. The Volksbund was caught with its pants down as the Hungarian authorities began a massive mustering of the Swabians into the Hungarian National Army shortly after the Waffen-SS recruitment drive. Even the prominent Volksbund leaders in their regional offices were called up to serve in the Hungarian Army. As all of this went on the families of the SS volunteers spread their annoyance and anger abroad. Alongside them, however, there was also a large portion of the German minority that was still pro-Hungarian even in 1942 when the German army was victorious. This caused the Bund to take stock of their situation, especially in the Batschka where Bund members attacked homes and smashed the windows of any Swabians they felt were pro-Hungarian and charged that their actions were examples of the kind of repression that was being suffered by the German minority in Hungary in the communiqués that they sent to the Reich. Activities like these on the part of the Bund would have their consequences.
Both the Hungarian government and Volksbund were on a collision course. The Hungarians feared the growing influence and the importance of the Bund to the Reich, while the Bund sought to extend its power base to call into existence a completely independent and autonomous organization. Between these two contending powers the broad spectrum of the masses were caught like a football between them in their struggle for power.
The struggle for power changed drastically during the first year after Hitler’s invasion of the
From a note written by Luther, the Under Secretary of State of the Reich, we learn that the new Hungarian Prime Minister Kállay gave the green light for a second SS recruitment and enlistment campaign to the Reich Foreign Minister. This verbal agreement for 10,000 additional volunteers was conveyed to the German ambassador in
The following are some letters written by the families of such volunteers:
The wife of Johann Dobler who was serving in the SS wrote: “For two months now we have not received the financial support we were promised and we have heard that no more would be forthcoming and if that is true then you should lay down your weapons and stop fighting.”
Katharina Herold of Szentfülöp wrote to Anton Herold in the SS: “I am upset about our Regional Führer and not for the first time. I have still not received any financial support. Whenever we question him, he answers that we have not submitted the proper paper work. I had always hoped that things would work themselves out even if it would take some time. But all of us became sick as I had written to you and the doctor told me that the families of all men in the Waffen-SS were entitled to free services from their doctor and pharmacist if I brought a note from the Regional Führer. When I asked him for one, he told me I had no right to it.”
According to Basch some of the chief and most vocal anti-recruitment propagandists were the wives of SS volunteers who complained about the lack of financial support they had had to live with. Many of the families were unable to provide for themselves or participate in the local economy especially those with family farms. Many of the deserters left because of the conditions they experienced in the German units. They were discriminated against and ridiculed by the Reich Germans and treated as inferiors.
The unrest over these issues in the Swabian enclaves was compounded by the Reich proposal for the total resettlement of the German minority in
Although volunteers in the SS were promised immediate Reich citizenship it was not actually forthcoming. Himmler substantiates this in a letter of January 21, 1943 in writing to SS Commanders Berger and Lorenz in which he repudiates the idea and says that volunteers who are not found to be physically fit are to be returned immediately to
On April 14, 1943 von Jagow reported to Himmler by telegram that there were 112,000 able bodied Swabians of military age, who were militarily trained consisting of 1,343 officers and 75,390 reservists. He estimated that they represented 3.2% of the Hungarian military. In October of 1942 the number of Germans actively serving had been assessed at 6,000 men by the Hungarian government while the Bund estimate was in the neighbourhood of 70,000 men serving in the Hungarian National Army.
Himmler’s objective could only be met if the men from the German minority serving in the Hungarian National Army were allowed to be recruited into the SS. The Hungarian government’s refusal to allow for recruitment from among its armed forces would disappoint Himmler while on the other hand if the Bund proceeded with a recruitment drive among the men not under arms in the Hungarian forces they would effectively bankrupt the manpower resources of the German minority. At that time the Hungarians were out to mobilize three new divisions themselves and would leave little room for an SS enlistment as well. Most of the technical units in the Hungarian Army were Swabian troops and it was in
But it was not only the Hungarian government that showed a desire to halt another SS enlistment, so did the German minority itself. From complaints raised and letters from the front we discover that the Hungarian authorities not only treated the volunteers in the SS as foreigners but also their families and dependents. All of the rights and the protection of the law were denied them. These sanctions against the families of the volunteers in the SS were strengthened and made more severe through efforts promoted by the County authorities and the police. From
They charged that those in the Waffen-SS and the Wehrmacht were dealt with in an unworthy manner and the Reich Germans called them, “Volksdeutsche Schweine” (ethnic German pigs). In one instance, during the time of their training, recruits from Lechnitz in
The irregular payment of support to families and the refusal to acknowledge the Reich citizenship of the SS volunteers continued. This simply solidified the impression the German minority in
The constant squabble involving the Reich Foreign Ministry, the German ambassador in
That this second SS recruitment campaign in
Before the campaign got underway the Hungarian government added a condition to the process in that all volunteers had to express their intentions to join the Waffen-SS in writing and present these letters to the regional Hungarian officials for their approval. In cases of volunteers under the age of twenty-four years his parents would have to submit their letter of approval as well. This of course set Basch off on a tangent claiming that the regional officials were fiercely anti-German and would oppose the recruitment in every way they could. The Volksbund feared the negative influence that the Hungarian authorities might have on the would-be volunteers. His cohort, Dr. Goldschmidt (he was a veterinarian like Basch), predicted all kinds of “special actions” the Hungarian police would unleash that would be much worse than during the first recruitment drive. The Bund leaders knew only too well that the vast majority of the German minority were totally opposed to any kind of resettlement or giving up their Hungarian citizenship and homeland. Basch knew that the second recruitment of volunteers would be troublesome and test the mettle of the Volksbund. But he along with the other agitators and spokesmen of the Bund went out to the far flung German communities across
In reporting to his superiors in Berlin Basch announced that 10,000 Germans serving in the Hungarian National Army on the Eastern Front were being released. While making an inspection tour in Swabian Turkey to welcome them home Basch was forced to report back to the VOMI that the troops were battle weary and were telling the local population of the brutality and atrocities of the German troops in Russia who had even shot Hungarian soldiers who protested their actions against the civilian population. These terrible experiences they had witnessed on the Russian front as members of the Hungarian National Army; the lack of financial support to the families of SS volunteers; the speeches of the Prime Minister Kállay calling for a Hungarian withdrawal from the war in Russia were just some of the factors that worked against the success of a second recruitment drive. In Basch’s report to
The Volksbund leadership immediately got to work and through intimidation and other pressures despite the Hungarian government’s ban against force of any kind were able to “recruit” some 20,000 men by February 8, 1944 for the Waffen-SS and send them off to assembly areas. The majority of these “coerced” recruits were assigned to the 11th SS Volunteer Pranzer Division “Nordland” and the rest to the 16th Panzer Division “Reichsführer-SS”.
This second enlistment of “volunteers” for the SS was an increase in numbers over the first in terms of the men who were accepted and mollified Basch’s original fears. The reason for the increase was due to the fact that all of the German minority were exposed to it and not just the members of the Volksbund which had been the case in the first and also including the men serving in the Hungarian National Army who were born in the years 1908-1925 who were now free to register with the Waffen-SS. All army commanders had to release their men, eight to nine days before the mustering to enable them to get the necessary papers and documents. On the basis of the signed agreement of May 22nd the Volksbund was given the task to provide the list of names of the men from the German minority serving in the Hungarian National Army who had been born between 1908-1925 but many names were missing or the information was incorrect and most of the men who were affected simply ignored it and remained in the Hungarian National Army.
It was no wonder the Reich pressed for all of the Germans in question to join the ranks of the SS formations in light of the critical situation on the crumbling Eastern Front.
For that reason the Bund used its own pressure tactics on the men called up to enlist and ordered the exclusion of any who refused from membership in the Bund and the German Youth Organization and indicated reprisals would be taken in the future. There were huge demonstrations and celebrations of the recruits leaving for training with the SS in September and October 1943 in the various regions of the country and Basch and Reich officials along with Hungarian government representatives were present for their send off, but all of the Bund Führers and functionaries in the specified age groups including Basch were exempted. That was the case in most of the communities in terms of their Bund leaders as well who were left behind to be in charge of the home front.
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