Loevy referred to a similar point with regard to sections 4 to 8 of the agreement, recalling that the British and French practiced “Ottoman colonial development” and that this experience served as a roadmap for subsequent war negotiations. [51] While Khalidi examined the negotiations of Great Britain and France in 1913 and 1914 on the Homs-Baghdad railway line, as well as their agreements with Germany, in other regions, as a “clear basis” for their subsequent spheres of influence under the agreement. [52] The agreement was first directly used as the basis for the Anglo-French modus vivendi of 1918, which provided a framework for the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration in the Levant. More generally, it was to lead indirectly to the subsequent partition of the Ottoman Empire after the Ottoman defeat of 1918. Shortly after the war, French Palestine and Mosul ceded to the British. Warrants in the Levant and Mesopotamia were awarded at the San Remo conference in April 1920, according to the Sykes-Picot framework; The British mandate for Palestine ran until 1948, the British mandate for Mesopotamia was to be replaced by a similar treaty with compulsory Iraq, and the French mandate for Syria and Lebanon lasted until 1946. The anatolic parts of the agreement were attributed by the Treaty of Sevres of August 1920; But these ambitions were thwarted by the Turkish War of Independence of 1919-23 and the Subsequent Treaty of Lausanne. Many sources claim that Sykes-Picot came into conflict with the Hussein-McMahon correspondence of 1915-1916 and that the publication of the agreement in November 1917 led to the resignation of Sir Henry McMahon. [107] There were several differences, iraq being the most obvious in the British red territory, and less obvious, the idea that British and French advisers would have control of the area designated as an Arab state. Finally, while the correspondence did not mention Palestine, Haifa and Acre should be British and the brown territory (a reduced Palestine) should become internationalized. [108] The agreement is seen by many as a turning point in Western and Arab relations.

She denied the promises made by the United Kingdom to the Arabs[9] concerning a national Arab homeland in the region of Syria in exchange for British support for the Ottoman Empire. The agreement was made public with others on 23 November 1917 in Moscow by the Bolsheviks[10] and repeated on 26 November 1917 in the British Guardian, so that “the British were displaced, the Arabs appalled and the Turks happy.” [11] [12] [13] The legacy of the agreement has caused too much discontent in the region, particularly among the Denarabern, but also among the Kurds, who were denied an independent state. [14] [15] [17] On 15 September, the British distributed a memory aid (which had been the subject of a private debate two days earlier between Lloyd George and Clemenceau [103]) in which the British withdrew their troops to Palestine and Mesopotamia and handed over Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo to troops. While accepting the withdrawal, clemenceau continued to insist on the Sykes-Picot agreement as the basis for all discussions. [104] The agreement effectively divided the Ottoman provinces outside the Arabian Peninsula into territories of control and influence of the United Kingdom and France. The countries controlled by Great Britain and France were divided by the Sykes-Picot line. [5] The agreement that gave Britain control of present-day southern Israel and Palestine, Jordan and southern Iraq, as well as another small area including the ports of Haifa and Acre, to allow access to the Mediterranean. [6] [7] [8] France should control southeastern Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. [8] In his introduction to a symposium on Sykes-Picot in 2016, law professor Anghie notes that much of the agreement entrusts “trade and trade agreements, access to ports and the construction of railways.” [50] Until the centenary of Sykes-Picot in 2016, the media[109] and science[110] generated strong interest in the long-term effects of the agreement.